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Spiritual Life 1
PAULC. VITZ

Angels, whether one believes in them or not, are defined as rational beings
without bodies. By contrast, we humans are known to be rational beings with
bodies. In a standard Judea-Christian framework, humans are not only rational beings that happen to have bodies, they are embodied rational beings.
That is, human mental life and human bodily life are theologically conceptualized as inextricably interwoven. The Greeks and their modern idealistic heirs,
on the other hand, see the human mind as only accidentally connected to the
body. For those taking this approach, we humans are rational beings who just
happen lo have bodies--but our bodies are only a necessary accident of having
a physical existence and are not intrinsic to who and what we are. For these
theorists, there is no necessary link between the nature of our body and the
nature of our mind.
I still remember, about 1960, as a graduate student in psychology, when I
was first introduced to the concept of a computer program. My professors
emphasized that the beauty and power of a program lay in its independence of
the particular physical material in which it might exist. A program, like a
statement in formal logic, could be written in chalk on a blackboard, it could
exist as a sequence of ones and zeros as written in machine language, it could
be punched as holes in a deck of IBM cards, it could be a magnetic pattern on
tape, or it could be a sequence of electronic states in the computer itself where
the program could be stored and then retrieved and run. These examples
should make it clear that a computer program, in its very nature, is remarkably free from any particular physical stuff. A program can be embodied in
almost any material so long as the material in question allows one to fix the
symbols expressing the program. And a program can be run in a computer
that uses widely different basic electronic elements. The elements must allow
for a rapid and reliable binary representation--e.g., on or off. However, vacuum tubes or silicon chips or who knows what in the future can serve this
function. In short, the program with its structure exists independent of any
particular physical medium. Strange as it may sound, a computer program is
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somewhat closer to an angel, that is to a rational intelligence without a body,
than it is to the mind of a human being--at least that is the claim being made
here.
In fact, this fundamental difference between a computer program and the
human mind has long been established empirically in the biological sciences.
And in the past few decades research in neurophysiology has very thoroughly
elaborated and deepened the evidence that the human mind is dependent on
the different particular materials of the brain. The research is well known,
though apparently the implication--that computer programs are quite different
from the human mind--is not commonly appreciated. Over 150 years ago, the
great German physiologist Johannes Muller first clearly articulated what is
known as the "law of specific nerve energies." Put simply, what this means is
that a given nerve gives rise to a sense quality that depends on the specific
character of the nerve. Stimulation of a visual nerve gives rise to visual
experience; stimulation of an auditory nerve gives rise to the experience of
sound, and so on. For example, in hearing there are specific nerve fibers in
the cochlea for almost every specific sound frequency. Thus, the hair cells on
the organ of Corti at the bottom of the cochlea respond to high frequencies,
while those at the top respond to low frequency sound. Now this principle is
far more general than the qualitative experience of the five senses for it
characterizes the central nervous system--e.g., the cortex--as well as the
peripheral senses. For example, recent research shows that this kind of
qualitative specificity is present in the auditory cortex where it is known as a
tonotopic map.2 That is, the frequencies to which the hair cells in the cochlea
are sensitive are mapped into columns of cortical cells--with each column of
cells responding only to a particular and very narrow band of tone frequencies.
The columns of cells are laid out in a spatial pattern that reproduces the
spatial structure in the cochlea. In short, the particular neurons in the
auditory cortex are not interchangeable, general-purpose neurons like silicon
chips; rather they are highly specific and qualitatively different.
This same principle characterizes the visual system--indeed here the degree
of specificity is, if anything, even greater than in the case of audition.3 In the
retina it has long been known that there are three different kinds of colorsensitive receptors (cones) plus light-sensitive receptors (rods). However,
research starting three decades ago has demonstrated that retinal ganglion
cells are also specialized for certain elementary kinds of light stimulation as
well as for retinal Jocation--the best identified types of ganglion cells are
known as X,Y and W cells; in the lateral geniculate nucleus (part of the brain)
visual neurons are specialized for one of four colors, for location on the retina,
and so on. In the visual cortex the specialized complexity expands even
further. Here we find groups of visual neurons specialized for straight lines of
different orientations ranging from vertical to horizontal (or spatial frequency
analyzers); cortical visual neurons appear to exist that respond only to
binocular disparity, while other groups of cortical neurons deal only with color
processing, still separate systems appear to specialize in form and movement
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perception. In short, throughout the structure of visual cortex there are
qualitatively distinct channels analyzing or responding to elementary visual
properties. Typically these channels process the various qualitatively different
kinds of visual info rmation in parallel, that is, at the same time.
Since the mid-nineteenth century it has been known that elsewhere in the
cortex there are special systems both for understanding speech (Wernicke's
area) and for producing speech (Broca's area). The motor cortex is another
major area of specialized neurons. Indeed the cortex is now known to consist
of a very large number of interconnected sub-systems of neurons, each with
specialized qualitatively different sensitivities. One major consequence of this
now-established understanding of the cortex is that to simulate the human
mind it will be necessary to simulate the human body.
This extension of the law of specific nerve energies from the peripheral
sensory system to the cortex clearly shows that the human brain operates on a
principle that is the opposite of a digital computer. That is, digital computers
are made of identical and interchangeable electronic elements. The possibility
that certain chips, for example, could only process one kind of information
(e.g., a payroll but not a mathematical equation or a business letter), would
destroy the utility, the very raison d'etre of the modern digital computer.
This is not to imply that all cortical neurons are qualitatively different from
each other.
Certainly within a cortical neural system there is some
redundancy. Thus, a whole column of cells in the visual cortex may be
sensitive to the same line orientation (or spatial frequency orientation); but
this local redundancy should not be allowed to keep us from understanding
that many different cortical areas are involved in qualitatively different kinds
of processing and experience.
In other words, the understanding of the cortex today is that it consists of a
complex, interconnected group of sub-systems. Each of the many sub-systems
represents a specialized and qualitatively different kind of processing; often
these sub-systems are also associated with qualitatively different conscious
experience. All th is means that the basic neural elements--or the "chips"--in
each sub-system would have to be highly specific and different from those in
each other sub-system; the same is also probably true for the large number of
interconnecting neural structures.
A different but closely related fundamental biological fact is that the
nervous system and the human body are intimately linked with properties of
the external physical world. As just one example, consider the range of light
waves that the human eye is sensitive to. This range, known as the visible
spectrum, is from about 380 nm (violet) to 760 nm (red). Now the potential
spectrum of light (electro-magnetic energy) is enormously greater and ranges
from extremely short waves (gamma rays) to very long radio waves and AC
circuits. The visible spectrum is thus a very small slice of this potential
spectrum. However, it is reasonable to assume that the human eye is only
concerned with the light available on the surface of the earth. To be able to
see waves that onJv exist elsewhere in the cosmos would he a wa!\te of
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biological energy and tissue. The human eye is, however, responsive to almost
all of the spectrum that actually reaches the surface of the earth with any
significant amount of energy. Only the relatively small ultra-violet and infrared parts of the spectrum are not part of our sensitivity. That is, the hum an
visible spectrum is close to the available spectrum on the surface of the earth.
Over and over again scient ists find evidence of this type showing how the body
is adaptcd--cven fine-tuned--to its environment.
There arc two well-known major theoretical understandings of the complex
and intimate connection between the human body and the external physical
world. 4 Among scientists today the most common is the atheistic or agnostic
theory of evolution. This familiar intellectual fram ework assumes that life
originated by chance and then evolved or developed over many millions of
years. For those who hold this view, life forms are understood to be a
marvelously complex, long-term, natural response or adaptation to the
surrounding physical and biological reality.
My own vicw--which can be called theistic evolution--accepts much of the
previous position; but, like many others, I assume that the physical and
biological world was created by God. In this framework the origin and
evolution of life over time is a God-governed phenomenon. However, the
nat ure of how the changes took place is a scientific question that can be
investigated without reference lo the Divinity. In spite of theoretical conOicl
about origins, both the at heistic and theistic versions of evolution accept
almost all of the same scientific findings. That is, they both assum e that life in
all its form s is closely connected to the outside environment in which life has
developed and to which it is adapted. Thus, both kinds of scientists assume an
animal's nervous system can't be understood when separated from its body
and neither the nervous system nor the body can be understood when
separated from the animal's environment, since the three constitute a mutually
interacting system.
The major point that mi nd is embodied is, of course, not a new one. For
example, recently it has been emphasized in the writings of the information
theorist Donald MacKay5 and in the discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AT)
by the philosopher Dreyfus, who sums his position by a quote from the poet
Yeats: "Man can embody the truth, but he cannot know it."6
I am aware that some of the difficulties that arise from ignori ng the body
arc beginning lo receive serious attention in Al and related areas. Neural
nets, now fairly common, are a small step toward a more neurological or
" body-like" model of the mind. Nevertheless, very serious difficulties remain
before even a modest simulation of the biological basis of mind appears
possible. One expression of the difficulties involved in the simulation of the
human brain is represented by the terms "hardware" and "software."
Hardware refers to the fixed physical and electronic components in a
computer or robot. However, there is no real hardware analogy to the human
body where even muscle and bone tissue arc, at best, a kind of "software." A
computer program is called softwa re, but there is no evidence that the
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program level actually exists for humans. The body exists and conscious
experience exisls, bul lhere is no evidence lhal a level analogous to a
computer program exists as a functioning part o f lhe brain/ mind. The
difficulties involved derive from the fact that computers and robots are based
o n silicon while animal life is primarily carbon based. Computers are not, in
principle, restricted to silicon systems, but they are all based on silicon
(including neural nets) fo r what appear to be practical rcasons--namely silicon
is cheap and allows very reliable binary representatio n. As such, silicon
systems are devoted to dryness, so Lo speak, while carbon systems are devoted
to wetness. Water quickly destroys or " kills" a computer, while too much
dryness quickly kills humans and other animals. T he brain is very much a wel
system and simulating il will have lo involve simulating th is very fundamental
property which is so different from computers. In brief, the human brain
consists o f d ifferent kinds of what might be called "wetware" and hardware
and software are irrelevant o r misleading terms. In any case my fundamental
point here is th at a true simulation of the human mind would require a
simulation of the human brain and body. Whether lhis is possible remains to
be seen.
In fact the intellectual world of the digital computer and of research on Al
is often far removed from lhc body and the world within which the body lives.
As previously no ted, the advocates of digital compuler programs as models of
mind reject, or al least commonly ignore, the connections between th e mind
and body. They lend to present a very abstracted or idealized view of reason
and of mental activity in general. With this as background and context, it is
now time to focus on o ur central topic--nameiy, artifi cial intelligence and the
spiritual life.
First, I wish to emphasize that the prior point o n the interrelatio nship of
the mind and body is proposed as an analogy to a similar interrelationship
between mind and spirit. Just as our mind is inextricably bound up with the
body and physica l reality, so it is likewise bound up with God and spiritual
reality. Thus, I starl wilh the assumption that there is a lransccndent spiritual
realm, and that the human mind is conslanlly interacting with this realm.
Now, I am fully aware of the fact lhal it is precisely this assumption that is
rejected by many scientists, especially those in the world of art ificial
intelligence. I wi ll examine the basis of this rejection and present a case for
the existence of spiritual reality. Obviously, this realm must first be accepted
as existing before one can accept its relevance for an understanding of mind.
Therefore, the subseq uent remarks are primarily addressed to the skeptical or
atheistic scientist.
Throughoul human history and its varied cult ures, three great external
realms of reality commonly have been assumed to exist. These are lhe
external physical world, lhe world of other minds and the transcendent
spiritual world (for example, of God or the gods). An interesting feature that
these lhrce presumed realities share is that we cannot prove the existence of
any of them. Indeed, some years ago the prominent philosopher Alvin
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Pla ntinga published a very important proof on the subjcct.7 Bric ny, wha t
Pla ntinga was able to prove was that the degree of rati onal a nd e mpirical
un ce rtainty about the existence of other minds and about the existence of God
is exactly the same. Tha t is, the ra tional grounds for accepting the existe nce o f
both of these realms has the same structure, and involves the same
assumptions--assumptions Plantinga shows are ofte n question-begging in both
cases. For example, we never directly experience other min ds and our
assumption that they exist is based on a n analogy with our own me ntal life.
Pla ntinga's proof itself is sophisticated a nd cannot b e summarized easily, but
its gene ral structure is not hard to outline. Plantinga first systematically shows
that neithe r natural theology nor natural "atheology'' offc rs a satisfying
solution to the proble m of a rational justification o f belief in G od 's existence
or o f God's non-existence. He th en tries another approach to th e justification
of belief in God by exploring its analogies and connections with a simila r
question--the " problem of othe r minds"; that is, how do you justify the
existe nce of other people's minds. Plantinga goes on to "defend the an alogical
argum ent fo r othe r minds against current criticism and argue th at it is as good
an answer as we have to the question of other minds. But it turns out that the
analogical a rgum e nt finally succumbs to a malady exactly resembling the one
afnicting th e teleological argume nt [for God's existence]." H e concludes tha t
" belief in o the r minds a nd belief in God arc in the same episte mological boat;
hence if eithe r is rational, so is th e othe r. But obviously the form er is rational;
so, th erefore, is the lattc r." 8 His formal proof for this conclusion has stood
without a successful challe nge for over 20 years.
Elsewhere Plantinga shows that just as we can't prove the existe nce of
other minds, it is also impossible to prove the existence of external physica l
reality, or even to prove the existe nce of the past.9 Again, he shows that the
failure in each proof is ide ntical to the failure in th e teleological argum e nt for
God's existe nce. One obvious implication of Plantinga's work is that if
scientists, for example, tend to assume the existence of physical reality and of
other minds but to reject that of God, then this is done on no n-ra ti onal
grounds. Before turning to some of the non-rational reasons be hind the
rejection o f the spiritual realm, it will be useful to discuss how it is tha t the
existence of the exte rnal world is commonly accepted. First, the proble m of
proving the existence of extern al reality arises once one accepts the fact that
our knowledge of external reality is always mediated by th e nervo us syste m.
All we a rc directly aware of is our own stat es of mind. We must--we can
only--infc r an extern al reality existing behind and act ing as a ca use of o ur
se nsa tions a nd perception. The validity of this infcre ncc is what ca nnot be
proved. We may accept Plant inga's reasoning in this ma tter o r we may be
convinced o n other grounds th at proving the existence of the physical wo rld is
not possible. The re is, of course, a lo ng line of skeptics on this issue in
Weste rn philosophy (including David Hume, Bishop Berkcly and Thomas
Reid), whose writings certainly support Plan tinga's conclusion.
Nevert heless, almost no one has eve r doubted physical reality to the point
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of trying seriously to live by such a position. If a person lived o n the basis of

such doubl il is nol clear why one would eat food, avoid walking into walls, or
even bother to get dressed. A few idealist philosophers in the last two
hundred years or so seem to be the intellectual representatives of a positio n
that de nies or comes close to denying the physical wo rld.
The overwhelming majority of scientists, and of average citizens of the
world, have always accepted the existence of an external physical reality.
Scientific theories are, after all, about something outside of us. The ground
for this acceptance seems to be that we are so made that sensory and
perceptual experience carries with it the overwhelmingly convincing notio n
that it is external reality that is experienced. Put somewhat diffcrently, our
normal interaction with what appears to be physical reality naturally creates a
firm convictio n of its existence.
Of course, in some rare instance one's perception of external reality may
be faulty. There are such things as illusions and hallucinations. But to believe
that the whole realm of physical reality doesn't exist, or that most, or even
much, of o ur perceptual experience is witho ut an exte rn al source, would be
considere d--wo uld be--bizarre indeed.
Except fo r certain kinds of
philosophers, such as the just-mentioned idealists (who arc given a kind of
philosophers' license to suspend common sense), anyone who fai led to believe
in the external wo rld would be judged as suffering from a mental path ology.
Likewise, o ur belief in the existence of other minds comes from interactio n
with o ther people. Sensory contact with a person plus interaction involving
language and symbols appears adequate for us to reliably assume the existence
of o the r minds. The tendency to interpret other minds as existing is so strong
that often it reaches the point of projecting mind onto something which is not
mind at all. Children project human minds o nto many animals; even trees or
inanimate objects, especially at night, are often understood by children as
having minds. Anthropologists commonly note that in so-called primitive
cultures certain special objects, such as a mask o r talisman, sometimes are
This
s upers titio usly und ers tood as possessing mind a nd spi rit.
anthropomorphism is o ne tendency scientists have traditio nally guarded
against. However, some of those in Al seem especially susceptible to this
error of projecting mind onto objects. For example, one prominent Al
scientist attributes beliefs to therm ostats. 10 Apparently therm ostats have three
beliefs: it is too hot, it is too cold, it is just right. That a therm ostat has beliefs
seems to me to be a rather crude, if updated, example of anthropo morphic
thinking.
Although even Al scientists may sometimes see in, or project mind onto
things o r places where it doesn't exist, few serio usly propose that o ther minds
do n't exist. Even if mind is assumed to be an expression of matter, few doubt
that o ther people's integrated consciousness--that is, thoughts, feelings and
purposes--actually exists. For all practical purposes everyone assumes both
the existence of other minds and also of physical reality.
It is import ant to note that a crucial issue with respect to initiating and
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maintaining contact with external physical or mental reality is whether the
person has the will or desire to initiate the interaction with the presumed
reality. For example, suppose you find a man who is on an artificial respirator
in a darkened room and who claims there is no external reality. After some
investigation yo u discover that he has not walked, or used his eyes or cars for
some time. His last tape-recorded utterance is a comme nt to the effect that
there is no external physical world. You desire to cure him of this intellectual
ailmcnt--one obviously supported by his markedly reduced physical and
perceptual activity. A reasonable strategy would be to strengthen his muscles,
get him to open his eyes, unstop his cars and lo talk with him often. Jn time,
you, his guide, would ask him lo walk and later to come out of his room and,
enter the outside world. Therapy for his pathological intellectual position is
thus to immerse him in the direct intcractional experience of the reality that
he denies. In this case there is every reason to believe that such a program
would convince him of the realist position. But such a procedure depends
upon his willingness to cooperate with you and, as for proof, that would

remain, as always, impossible.
Suppose you find someone who not only denies that other mi nds exist--but
lives as though other minds don't exist. (Such a position, of course, seems to
be quite rare.) Let us also suppose, as would be likely, that our subject's
condition is strongly supported by his social isolation. He lives alone and has
for years. He never speaks lo anyone. As a result, his lack of belief in other
minds is hardly surprising. He remembers interacting with people when he
was you ng, but these experiences he attributes to a childish and immature
understanding of things al the time. Again, this man's condition is
fundamentally a mental pathology and correction would involve the slow
introduction of interpersonal communication into his life. In time he would
discover fri ends, and enemies; perhaps even love. Years later, if he were to be
reminded by an old friend of his form er belief that othe r minds didn't exist,
the only answer, and a likely one, would be Lo look at his fri end and laugh. In
short, interaction with other minds is necessary in order to accept their
existence, indeed in most cases it is sufficient.
Let me suggest that the situation with respect to belief in the transcendent
spiritual realm is similar. First note that most of the people who deny not only
the existence of God but also the entire spiritual realm constitute a relatively
small group that seems to have come into existence in Western Europe about
250 years ago. They live in rather peculiar environments, and most of them
have been trained in science or other rationalistic and int ellectual disciplines.
They tend to work in laboratories and universities which arc highly specialized
and peculiar places. They tend to socialize mostly with those having similar
skeptical outlooks. What they mean by " real thi nking" is the mental
manipulation of abstract written symbols, often numbers, or other very digital
clements. To such people a proper belief system or world view is something
constructed by correct sequencing of these symbols with occasional checks on
whether some kind of observa tion backs it up. Thal is, their world view is
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something that exists in a digital code and they seem to assume that digital
codes are adequate for representing any kind of question, problem or
knowledge. The very notion of a belief system based o n an oral traditio n of
knowledge, or on analog information coded in the body and often unavailable
to conscious verbal expression, or on a world view based primarily on direct
personal experience, doesn't occur to them.
Also "strange" is the fact that these people never, or almost never, go to
church o r to a synagogue o r read religious writings. But, most peculiar of all
is that they appear never to pray, to meditate o r to engage in other spiritual
exercises. That is, they rarely, if ever, use the well-known procedures for
getting and staying in contact with the spiritual realm.
Again, the answer to this patho logy is not some vain att empt to prove the
existence of God or of spiritual reality. As in the other cases this is impossible
anyway. The answer is to try to convince such a person to pray, that is to talk
with G od, or listen for God's voice, or to engage in oth er spiritual activities. If
such a person refuses to interact with the transcendent and is determined to
remain in his spiritual isolation, there is little else one can do.
This requirement that one engage in prayer and meditation is a serious
one. For example, if someone doubted some astronomical claim (such as the
existence of moons around Jupiter) or the reality of a whole level of physical
existence (such as sub-atomic particles), an honest search for an answer would
require a number of things. First, the person, if ignorant of astronomy o r
physics, would need a guide--a trained scientist--and would have to become at
least something of an amateur scientist. It would take considerable time and
commitment from the seeker. After all, observations are often ambiguous;
and, in any case, observations don't reliably interpret themselves.
In almost all religious and spiritual traditions, a kn owledgeable person--a
g uide, if you will--is needed. And, prayer and meditation are the primary
instruments, the " telescopes," for co ntacting o r interacting with spiritual
reality. No scientist who refuses to seek religious experience has the
intellectual right to say that spiritual reality doesn't exist or th at the mind
cannot be affected by that reality. A person who has had no religious
experience is simply unqualified to comment on the existence, much less the
nature, of most spiritual phenomena. Please note, I am no t saying that the
person must have a particular interpretation o r understand ing of his religious
or spiritual experience--only that he must have had a reasonable amo unt of
such experience. P erhaps, after various religious experiences the person will
conclude it was all an illusion or something other than what it first appeared to
be. Fine. Scientific observations, too, can be mistaken; they can be artifacts,
and so can particular spiritual experiences. Or perhaps even all such
experience is illusory. However, a scientist without systematic empirical
understanding of a phenomenon is not in a position to give informed criticism .
And a scientist who was ignorant of and refused to get involved with the
experim ental methodo logy used to demonstrate that a major phenomenon
existed would be considered irrelevant to evaluating the claim. If he actively
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persisted in rejecting the phenomenon on a priori grounds, his colleagues
would rightfully dismiss his claims as unqualified--even should subsequent
research prove his position to be right.
I trust the argument is clear. Religion for most people is supported by
religious or spiritual experience in which people claim a relationship o r
interaction with a spiritual realm. This may mean interaction with God, or
Jesus, or with a dead person, or even with evil spirits. To evaluate the validity
of these extremely important claims r equires that an investigator seek contact
with spiritual reality. There are various ways people do this--but first they
must have the will to actively seek. The desire to seek, of course, is something
rooted in psychological factors and has relatively little to do with what is
usually called by such terms as "reason" or "evidence." Given the will to seek,
then the most common instruments or techniques for contact with spiritual
reality are prayer and meditation; they are, the telescopes of the religious
person. No true scientist should be afraid to seek new knowledge or be afraid
to look through any kind of telescope.
The primary reason for presenting the preceding case for belief in the
transcendent realm is because of its bearing on the intellectual problem of
artificial intelligence. Al is involved in simulation of intelligence--often this
means simulating the human mind. The possible existence of mental
interaction with spiritual reality, in particular with God, relates to this task.
For example, if God exists and if some people, some of the ti me, are do ing
God's will and not their own will--then the problem of simulating human
mental life takes on serious difficulties, to put it mildly. On the other hand, if
God and other spiritual "persons" or forces are purely psychological
phenomena, projected into " heaven" so to speak, then such co ncepts may add
complexity to simulating the mind, but no dramatic new o r impossible
challenge is involved.
A secondary reason, however, for introducing the topic of spiritual reality is
to provide a framework for comment o n the moral implications of state ments
and attitudes sometimes found in the world of Al. In my own contact with
scientists in Al, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, sometimes I have
encountered an attitude toward humans that I find extremely disturbing. A
small but significant number of these scientists have a hard, hostile attitude
toward any appreciation of humanity that implies human specialness.
Apparently, the very no tion of special human characteristics such as our free
will o r having a transcendent spiritual meaning is viewed as a threat to an
intellectual desire to demonstrate we humans are nothing but matter, or
nothing but a complex computer. Let me quote from one prominent Al
professor. He said that the next generation of computers will be so intelligent
that we will " be lucky if they are willing to keep us around as household
pets." 11 The attitude of hostility and even contempt expressed toward humans
in such a statement is obvious. That humans will soon be the slaves to a
master race of machines is, however, fundamentally a totalitarian goal. Why
should anyone support such a purpose? If the proposed o utcome is possible,
then it is certainly morally rational for people to refuse to fund such scientists
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and their research. If the goal is not possible, then the attitude expressed by
such remarks does much to harm the good name of science. Scientists today
are rightfully worried about the growth of an anti-scientific mentality in the
non-scientific community. This growth is quite real, both on the political right
and especially on the political left. However, subtle or gleeful comments
about humans having no free will and soon being replaced by powerful,
complex computers or bio-computer systems does little to endear science or
scientists to the non-scientific world. Instead such fundamentally nonscientific and often irrational statements by scientists create a morally justified
fear of science on the part of those outside the scientific community.
The very power, size and complexity of contemporary science suggests that
it should be especially interested in avoiding the dangerous attitudes that
power, size and complexity so often create. The contemporary scientific
environment is very different from that of even 50 years ago. Today in science
the effects of personal ambition, ideology, unscrupulous empire building,
obvious financial rewards and power are especially noticeable. Interest group
pressures, moral anarchy and lack of mutual cooperation also are not
uncommon in the contemporary scientific community. Unless scientists work
conscientiously to counter anti-scientific attitudes within AI, as elsewhere,
there is real danger that growing external criticism of science will cause the
scientific baby to be thrown out with its dirty bath water. In fighting such
external criticism, science, which is (or should be) a bulwark of sanity should
not allow itself to be poisoned from within by the anti-human and other biased
attitudes of a small group of its present practitioners.
Now, I am convinced that AI, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology all
have major positive contributions to make to the human condition. I am
equally convinced that this field needs to recover more of an attitude of
humility as it studies the mind. Let me suggest that if scientists recover an
awareness of God and of our spiritual destiny it may be a great facilitator of
such an attitudinal change. An attitude of humility and wonder before the
natural world has been an essential quality of the great scientists from
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton to Einstein. Histo rically this attitude has
been rooted in the belief in God. u
In any case, although there is much to learn about both artificial and
natural mind, to reject in advance a spiritual perspective on human mind
because it implies limits to scientific understanding is an irrational bias.
Science has learned to live with uncertainty principles, Godel's proof and
similar knowledge about intellectual limits. Science has also learned to live
with the mind/body problem. It can also learn to live with (and even to
benefit from) a mind/spirit problem.

Notes
1. A later and somewhat extended discussion of the ideas presented here can be
found in "God, The Body and The Good Life," published in This World., 25 (Spring
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3. This info rmation can be found in most good rece nt treatments of the nervous
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